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Iaquinta: Search Incident to Arrest in New York

INTERPRETING SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST IN NEW
YORK: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Luna1
(decided March 29, 2012)
The Fourth Amendment has been a topic of discussion and a
focus for debate since its inception. Throughout history, there has
been disagreement on how strictly the amendment and its exceptions
should be applied. There have been periods of time in which courts
have applied a strict construction, focusing on protecting individual’s
rights.2 At other times, courts have applied a loose construction, allowing for more police discretion.3
New York has further muddied the waters by pursuing its own
route when it comes to protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights. This was done through the implementation of an exigency requirement, which narrowed the ability to conduct a warrantless
search incident to arrest.4 This note examines modern searchincident-to-arrest law in the State of New York, focusing on one recent case, People v. Luna.
The issue in Luna was to what extent the Fourth Amendment
protects an individual from searches of his person and effects incident
to a lawful arrest. This note analyzes the evolution of the current law
and compares the federal approach to the New York approach, specifically in the context of closed containers. It shows that many
commentators believe that New York erred in diverging from the
1

No. 5113-08, 2012 WL 1059392 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012).
See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 669 (1948); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931) (finding that a search warrant must first be obtained
whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4
People v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (N.Y. 1983).
2
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federal approach, and it addresses the criticisms of those critics. Finally, this note suggests a framework, which if applied uniformly,
would result in consistency. It concludes by discussing the future
implications of the proposed framework.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment was created, in large part, as a reaction to the risks that warrantless searches posed to the colonists in
early America.5 It was designed to serve the important function of
protecting early colonists against abuse from an oppressive government.6 As such, the Fourth Amendment was created to govern all
searches and seizures carried out by governmental officials.7 The
Supreme Court imposed a presumptive warrant requirement, where
any search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless
justified.8 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, “a warrant authorized by a neutral and detached judicial officer is a more reliable
safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a
law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.”9 There are, of course, certain circumstances

5

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
761 (1969).
6
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of
Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 978-91, for an in-depth history of the Fourth
Amendment.
7
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (reasoning that if the authority to
decide whether a search may be conducted is placed with law enforcement, without review
by a disinterested magistrate, it “would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.”); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that subject to several well-delineated exceptions, warrantless
searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).
9
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9
(1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (“The classic statement of
the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment”).
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where the warrant requirement may be dispensed with.10 As a result,
the Supreme Court has carved out over twenty exceptions, which allow a search to be conducted in the absence of a warrant.11 One such
example is a search conducted incident to an arrest.
The Supreme Court’s application of the search-incident-toarrest exception has been anything but uniform. There have been ongoing debates regarding the scope of search authority provided by
this exception. The debates center on the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, as the framers did not provide instruction on how its
two separate clauses should be reconciled. The first clause requires
that searches and seizures be ‘reasonable,’ and the second clause imposes a requirement that all warrants must be supported by probable
cause.12 This has allowed for two separate views to emerge in regards to search incident to arrest.
The first view is the reasonableness approach, which finds
that a lawful arrest is a “reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to arrest
requires no additional justification.”13 This view is based on the underlying theory that a search is justified because the intrusion is “in
reality de minimus” compared to the major intrusion of privacy
caused by the arrest itself.14 This approach draws a bright-line rule
that is predictable and easy to apply.15 A search is reasonable when it
accompanies a lawful custodial arrest.16 Thus, the decision to search
is left entirely to the arresting officer, which provides for greater police discretion.17
10

Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-15.
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1473-74 (1985).
12
Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 3 (2006).
13
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 461 (1981).
14
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *4.
15
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925); but see Belton, 453 U.S. at 464
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (cautioning against this approach, and instead suggesting that
“courts should carefully consider the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure.”).
16
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; see also Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1228 (Jasen, J., concurring)
(“The only reasonable restriction would be that the search occur in close spatial and temporal
proximity to the arrest.”).
17
The Court in Chimel suggested the problem with the reasonableness approach is that its
argument is “founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on consideration relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would
approach the evaporation point.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764-65.
11
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In contrast, the second approach requires additional justification, other than the lawful arrest, before a search may be conducted.
The warrant-primacy approach takes the view that a warrantless
search may be conducted only when it is shown that dispensing with
the warrant requirement was necessary.18 In other words, there must
be some justification as to why a warrant could not have been obtained prior to the search. This approach examines the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular search before determining
whether it was reasonable.19 What has resulted from the two differing approaches is a pendulum that swings back and forth through history, granting limited search authority incident to arrest in some cases
and broader search authority in others.
II.

FEDERAL HISTORY OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST

The concept of search incident to arrest appears to have first
been recognized by the Supreme Court in 1914.20 In Weeks v. United
States,21 the Court seemingly approved of the warrantless search of
the ‘person’ subject to a lawful arrest.22 In Carroll v. United States,23
the Court interpreted the reasoning in Weeks to include “whatever is
found upon his person or in his control.”24 That search authority was
later expanded to include a search of the person, as well as “the place
where the arrest is made” in order to obtain evidence of the crime
committed.25 The Court affirmed this authority in Marron v. United
States,26 but it later limited the search authority with its decision in
18

People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745, 755 (N.Y. 1982) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citing
People v. Brosnan, 298 N.E.2d 78, 86 (N.Y. 1973) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (“[C]areful
study of the (Federal) ‘exception’ cases will reveal that the rationale underlying the case
where the exception was established was not that there was a good reason to search, but that
there was a good reason why a search warrant could not be obtained.”).
19
See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I continue to believe ‘[t]he
scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some
point, the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
20
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755.
21
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
23
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
24
Id. at 158.
25
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
26
275 U.S. 192 (1927). The court held that because there was a lawful arrest, the police
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Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States.27 In the latter case, the
Court found that although there was an “abundance of information”
at the time of the search to procure a search warrant, the fact that the
arresting officer had not first obtained a warrant rendered the search
unlawful.28 This limited interpretation was soon disregarded in Harris v. United States,29 where the defendant was arrested pursuant to an
arrest warrant based on a forged check.30 The officers arrested the
defendant in his living room, and then “undertook a thorough search
of the entire [four-room] apartment” with the intent of recovering additional evidence used in the commission of the crime.31 The Court
found the search permissible as incident to arrest.32
Within a year, “the pendulum swung again.”33 In Trupiano v.
United States,34 the Court referred back to the views from Go-Bart,
and stressed the importance of the warrant-primacy approach when it
stated, “[i]t is a cardinal rule that . . . law enforcement agents must
secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.”35
Two years later, the Court rejected this rule in United States v.
Rabinowitz.36 There, it held the test “is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.”37
In Chimel v. California,38 the Court disagreed and instead
read the Fourth Amendment “in light of the history that gave rise to
its words,” which is consistent with the warrant-primacy approach.39
The Court agreed that it is “entirely reasonable for the arresting officer” to search the person of the arrestee, as well as the area into
which the arrestee might reach in order to protect officers from dan-

had a right to contemporaneously search the place where the arrest took place without a warrant. Id. at 199.
27
282 U.S. 344 (1931).
28
Chimel, 396 U.S. at 757 (citing Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 358) (noting also that the arrestee
was not arrested during the commission of the crime).
29
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
30
Id. at 148.
31
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 758 (citing Harris, 331 U.S. at 148).
32
Harris, 331 U.S. at 155.
33
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 758.
34
334 U.S. 669 (1948).
35
Id. at 705.
36
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
37
Id. at 66.
38
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
39
Id. at 760-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ger and to preserve evidence from concealment or destruction.40
However, because the search at issue went beyond that limited area,
the Court found it was unreasonable.41
In United States v. Robinson,42 the Court addressed whether
the search of a closed container fell within the exception.43 There,
the search involved a cigarette package found in the arrestee’s pocket
after he was arrested for driving without a license.44 The Court noted
that “[t]he validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest
ha[d] been regarded as settled from its first enunciation, and ha[d]
remained virtually unchallenged until the present case.”45
That challenge had been presented by the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) Court of Appeals when it held that in order to search a
cigarette box, there must be some justification other than the lawful
arrest.46 The D.C. Court of Appeals reasoned that because Robinson
had been arrested for a driving offense and “there would be no further
evidence of such a crime to be obtained in a search of the arrestee,”
the officer was limited to conducting a frisk for weapons.47
The Supreme Court disagreed and instead followed the reasonableness approach. A lawful arrest is a “reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to arrest requires no additional justification.”48 Thus, the Court
overruled the holding of the D.C. Court of Appeals and found that a
lawful arrest, which in itself granted the authority to search, justified
the full search of the person.49 Through this holding, the Court implied that a full search includes not only the search of the person but
the search of his effects as well—crumpled cigarette boxes included.
The Court in Robinson held, for the first time, that an unqualified au-

40

Id. at 763.
Id. at 768. After arresting the defendant in his house pursuant to an arrest warrant, “the
officers then looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage,
and a small workshop.” Id. at 753-54.
42
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
43
Id. at 236.
44
Id. at 220, 223.
45
Id. at 224 (including a search of the arrestee as well as the area within his control).
46
Id. at 227.
47
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227.
48
Id. at 235.
49
Id. at 235. The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals conclusion that “the only
reason supporting the authority for a full search incident to [a] lawful arrest was the possibility of discovery of evidence or fruits.” Id. at 233.
41
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thority exists to search incident to arrest.50
III.

SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST IN NEW YORK

Despite the identical language of the United States and the
New York State constitutional search and seizure provisions,51 the
New York Court of Appeals has invoked its power to grant further
protections to its citizens. New York’s highest court did so by implementing an exigency requirement, thereby diverging from the federal search-incident-to-arrest approach.
When the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. De
Santis52 in 1978, it was still following the framework provided by the
Supreme Court. The Court used a reasonableness approach that
where an arrest is reasonable, a search of the arrestee and “the area
within his immediate control” does not require any additional justification.53 Based on this premise, the court ruled, “a warrantless
search, not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest, is
lawful.”54
Several years later, in People v. Belton,55 the court touched
upon the search-incident-to-arrest exception—this time in conjunction with the automobile exception. Here, the search at issue involved the defendant’s jacket located on the back seat of the car,
where a small amount of cocaine was recovered from inside a zippered pocket.56 In 1980 the case first reached the Court of Appeals,
which concluded that the search of the zippered pocket was invalid as
a search incident to arrest because there was no immediate exigency.57 The People appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
50

Id. at 230 (“Virtually all of the statements of this Court affirming the existence of an
unqualified authority to search incident to a lawful arrest are dicta.”).
51
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”),
with N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
52
385 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1978).
53
Id. at 579.
54
Id. at 580.
55
407 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1980).
56
Id. at 421.
57
Id. at 423.
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which overruled the Court of Appeals, and found the search valid as
incident to arrest because there was a lawful custodial arrest and the
search was conducted contemporaneously.58
On remand, the Court of Appeals abandoned its earlier ruling
and upheld the search but for a new reason this time around.59 It
made clear the search was now upheld via the automobile exception,60 despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not explore this exception.61 Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not directly respond to
the Supreme Court’s holding regarding the search-incident-to-arrest
exception.62 The ultimate disposition at the state level left an important issue open for determination: whether a search of a closed
container may be conducted incident to arrest, even where no exigency exists, so long as the search is done contemporaneously.63 Thus,
Belton’s unique procedural history allowed New York to carve its
own path.64 What resulted was a substantive impact on search incident to arrest law in the State of New York.
In People v. Smith,65 the New York Court of Appeals responded by adding an exigency requirement, thereby limiting De
Santis and narrowing the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Under
the State Constitution,
A person’s privacy interest in a closed container readily accessible to him may become subordinate to the
need of the People, under exigent circumstances, to
search it for weapons or evidence that otherwise might
be secreted or destroyed . . . . [The] container may not
be searched for a weapon or evidence if it is apparent
that it is so securely fastened that the person arrested
58

Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63.
Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 746.
60
Id. (“A majority of this court now concludes that the search which followed defendant’s
lawful arrest was permissible under the State Constitution under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement.”).
61
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 463 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court does not find it
necessary to consider the ‘automobile exception’ in its disposition of this case.”).
62
Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 746 (“We do not find it necessary to consider the Supreme
Court’s rationale as applied to our Constitution, however, for we now hold on a different rationale [that the search was valid.]”).
63
Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226.
64
The law could have been solidified by the Court of Appeals had it “simply affirm[ed]
the determination of the Supreme Court on remand, without further comment.” Belton, 432
N.E.2d at 748 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
65
452 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1983).
59
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cannot quickly reach its contents, or the person arrested makes it unmistakably clear that he will not seek to
reach the contents, or the container is so small that it
could not contain a weapon or evidence of the crime.66
The reasonableness of an officer’s assertion that an exigency exists
must be measured at the time of the arrest because the justification to
search will not necessarily dissipate.67 So long as an exigency is present at the time of arrest and the subsequent search is “not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest,” a search may be conducted, regardless of the circumstances existing at the time of the
search itself.68
Less than five months later, the Court of Appeals revisited the
issue in People v. Gokey.69 The court explicitly held that where an arrested individual has a privacy interest in a closed container within
his reach, a search of that container could only be justified by “the
safety to the public and the arresting officer; and the protection of evidence from destruction or concealment.”70 Furthermore, the court
instructed that the prosecution must affirmatively assert the presence
of an exigency in order to overcome the requirement and justify a
warrantless search.71
After Gokey, the Court of Appeals remained silent on the
search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of closed containers
for over three decades.72 Finally, in People v. Jimenez,73 the court readdressed the issue. It found that two separate requirements must be
met in order for a warrantless search to be justified.74 First, the
search must be conducted within close space and time from the ar-

66

Id. at 1227 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
68
Id.
69
457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983).
70
Id. at 724-25.
71
Id. at 725.
72
During this time, lower court decisions begged, figuratively speaking, for the Court of
Appeals to revisit the issue. As will be demonstrated, this necessity arose due to inconsistent
holdings and criticisms regarding the current state of the law. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text; see also infra part VI.
73
People v. Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481 (N.Y. Feb. 25, 2014). Due to how recently this
case was decided, no lower court cases have been decided since. As such, this article will
examine the analysis of lower court opinions in light of Smith and Gokey, without taking
Jimenez into consideration.
74
Id. at *3.
67
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rest.75 “The second, and equally important,” requirement is that exigent circumstances must be affirmatively demonstrated.76 However,
in Jimenez, neither officer asserted a fear for “his safety or the integrity of any destructive evidence,” nor was such a fear objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.77 Therefore, the
court held that the warrantless search was improper.78
Since Gokey, lower courts in New York have not applied the
holdings of Smith and Gokey with much uniformity. In at least one
instance, the Second Department strictly construed the exigency requirement, and found a search incident to arrest to be unjustified
where the search was undertaken for reasons other than the need to
either detect a weapon or evidence of a crime.79 In contrast, the Third
Department has applied a loose construction, and found the requirement satisfied by a blanket assertion that the possibility of an exigency existed.80 The First Department has applied a strict construction in
some cases,81 while it referred back to the De Santis-Belton era to apply a broad, reasonableness approach in others.82
The judicial history, differing focuses, and inconsistent applications, make it clear that the current state of law in New York is anything but settled. The same search-incident-to-arrest exception is
applied in drastically different fashions, and as a result, outcomes are
unpredictable. Hopefully, a more coherent path will be followed in
light of the Court of Appeals direction provided in Jimenez, however,
that is yet to be seen. A closer, in-depth analysis of People v. Luna
illustrates the need for a more refined approach.
75

Id.
Id. at *3, *4 (“[There must be] reasonable belief that the suspect may gain possession of
a weapon or be able to destroy evidence located in the bag.”).
77
Id. at *4, *5.
78
Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *5.
79
See People v. Branch, 687 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999) (“Nor was the
search a lawful incident to an arrest, as the detectives concededly searched the jacket for
identification, rather than for a weapon or evidence of a crime.”).
80
See People v. Schobert, 463 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1983) (discussing
the validity of the seizure of the defendant at length and then stating, “the exigent circumstances, including the possibility that the contraband might be destroyed, justified an immediate arrest and search.”).
81
See generally People v. Evans, 922 N.Y.S.2d 403 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011); People v.
Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007); People v. Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d
162 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995).
82
See generally People v. Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998); People
v. Baker, 679 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998); People v. Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997).
76
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PEOPLE V. LUNA

During the summer of 2008, the New York Police Department
(“NYPD”) initiated an investigation to pursue the principle target of a
cocaine-dealing operation, a man identified as Kelly.83 That fall, the
NYPD decided to “take down” the operation and contacted Kelly in
order to purchase 100 grams of cocaine.84 An undercover officer carried out the transaction, and Detective Macias was instructed to remain nearby in an undercover vehicle.85 At the sale location, a white
taxi drove past the undercover officer’s vehicle and then returned to
the area.86 Shortly after, the defendant approached the undercover officer’s vehicle and knocked on the window; the undercover officer
rolled down the window and asked, “Where’s Kelly?”87 The defendant, later identified as Antonio Luna,88 pointed in the direction of the
parked taxi.89 Macias moved in to apprehend Luna, identifying himself as a police officer and displaying his shield as he approached.90
After facing Luna, Macias noticed a cigarette box in Luna’s hands.91
Macias handcuffed Luna’s hands behind his back, took the cigarette
box from Luna’s hands, conducted a quick pat down, and searched
the cigarette box.92 Inside the box, Macias found cocaine in a clear
plastic bag.93
The court first addressed whether probable cause existed to

83

Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *1.
Id. at *2. Prior to this occasion, the police had purchased cocaine approximately five
times from Kelly and those working with him. Id. at *1. The individuals acted in various
capacities, such as deliverers, lookouts, and handlers of money. Id. Although Kelly was not
present at each transaction, he had some degree of participation in each, for example,
knowledge that each transaction occurred. Id.
85
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *2.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
At the time of the “take down,” Luna was not known to be involved with the drug operation, and neither the undercover officer nor the lead investigator recognized him. Id. However, the investigation team was first introduced to Luna prior to the initial purchase of cocaine from Kelly. Id. Luna and Kelly had been walking on the street when the police
stopped them in order to “obtain the identity of Kelly and the person he was with at the
time.” Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *2. During this encounter, Kelly identified himself as
Kelly Gomez, and Luna identified himself as Antonio Luna. Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at *3.
91
Id.
92
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3.
93
Id.
84
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carry out the arrest.94 Next, it discussed the governing law in New
York concerning the search at hand.95 At the outset, the court reiterated the principle that a warrantless search conducted incident to arrest is only permissible in certain circumstances.96 It then immediately made reference to the Robinson-De Santis rationale that a search
incident to arrest is justified because the intrusion is “in reality de
minimus” compared to the major intrusion of privacy caused by the
arrest itself.97 Despite this “core rationale,” the court acknowledged
that the New York Constitution requires exigent circumstances.98
The court pointed to Gokey as the decision that “diverged
from federal constitutional law” and shed light on how the added exigency requirement led to inconsistent applications.99 It referred to
Rosado, Hendricks, and Evans, to display disagreement with the strict
application approach.100 It cited to Wylie, Watkins, and Baker to
demonstrate the approach focused on timing and exclusive control.101
The court in Luna discussed three cases dealing with the
search of a cigarette box.102 In People v. Thompson,103 the search was
upheld because the box had not been in the exclusive control of the
police, the search occurred in close space and time, and the officer
had a reasonable fear for safety, without explaining how. 104 In People v. Schobert,105 the court upheld the search of a gold cigarette case,
stating it was justified by exigent circumstances but never actually
explained the exigency.106 In People v. Allen,107 the warrantless
search of a cigarette box was found invalid because there were no ex94

Id. at *3-4. For purposes of this article, because it is focused on search incident to arrest, the validity of the arrest is not contested. However, it is important to note that Luna
was arrested based on “probable cause to believe he was a participant in the arranged sale of
narcotics between Kelly and [the undercover officer].” Id. at *4.
95
Id.
96
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *4.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at *5 (displaying disagreement with the notion that a higher privacy interest attaches when a closed container is involved).
101
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *6.
102
Id.
103
703 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000).
104
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7 (citing Thompson, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 149).
105
463 N.Y.S.2d 277 (App Div. 3d Dep’t 1983).
106
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7 (“The Court did not explain why this exigency allowed
the search of the cigarette case at the police station.”) (citing Schobert, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 279).
107
675 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Crim. Ct. 1998).
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igent circumstances; therefore, there was no reason why a warrant
could not first be obtained.108
Like many other courts, the court in Luna applied its own variation of the exigency requirement to conclude that the search was
valid. It found that the circumstances surrounding Luna’s arrest justified the police’s reasonable belief that the container possibly contained narcotics109 and that Luna “could easily have taken steps to destroy or conceal the contents of the cigarette box.”110 To support this
inference, the court noted several facts: Luna initially demonstrated
resistance upon arrest;111 Luna continued to hold the box in his hands,
even as he was handcuffed; and at the time of arrest, Detective
Macias and Luna were alone on the street.112 Further, “before, during, and immediately after” Luna’s arrest, Detective Macias was in a
position of vulnerability because Macias “placed his arm through Luna’s handcuffed arms to prevent him from escaping.”113 Therefore,
the circumstances presented the need to protect officer safety because
Macias was “in a position where he could easily have been physically
assaulted” by Luna.114 Finally, the court justified the search because
it took place “in close spatial and temporal proximity” to Luna’s arrest.115 Based on those reasons, the court found that the search of the
contents of the cigarette box was lawful and valid.116
The court in Luna concluded its opinion with a lengthy display of its discontent with the current state of search-incident-toarrest law in New York, “with the hope that such thoughts might
make some contribution to the development of the law in this important area.”117 The court emphasized its viewpoint that New York
108

Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7 (quoting Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 485, 486).
Id. (stating that Luna was present at the scene because of his participation in the
planned narcotics transaction, and the cigarette box was held in his hands).
110
Id.
111
Id. The court was referring to the fact that Luna was “initially a ‘little resistant’ and
‘tensed up’ when Detective Macias identified himself as a police officer,” and Luna failed to
comply with Macias when he ordered Luna to turn around. Id. at *3. Interestingly, the court
cited to People v. Doe as support, despite the fact that there, the defendant was “subdued by
police after a struggle.” Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7; People v. Doe, 711 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000).
112
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at *8.
117
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *8.
109
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erred in diverging from the federal approach and gave a list of
“anomalies and problems” which have resulted.118 It concluded that
the exigency requirement created significant negative consequences
because it is hard to apply, invites arbitrary rulings, and promotes
counterproductive incentives.119
V.

PAST: THE HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S DEPARTURE FROM
THE FEDERAL APPROACH

When discussing the opinion that New York should not have
deviated from the federal approach, the court in Luna is not alone;
other courts and judges agree.120 However, in order to determine
whether the Court of Appeals erred in departing from the federal approach, a full understanding of why it diverged is crucial.
The vague language of the Fourth Amendment has led to two
competing theories on how warrantless searches should be analyzed.
It is no secret that federal courts follow the reasonableness approach,
where an arrest provides authority to search without further justification.121 In New York, on the other hand, the notion of adopting the
more restrictive warrant-primacy approach was alluded to as early as
De Santis.122 In Belton, the Court of Appeals neither rejected nor accepted the Supreme Court’s approach expressly; however, it did imply that a warrantless search incident to arrest must be justified by either the need to preserve evidence relating to the crime, or the need to
dispel danger.123
In Smith, the Court of Appeals instructed for the first time that
the Federal and New York State warrant requirement provisions are
to be measured differently. It implied disagreement with the Supreme Court’s “bright line” reasonableness interpretation by noting
118

Id.
Id. at *10.
120
Id. at *11; see also Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1228 (Jasen, J., concurring) (“I perceive no
rationale for creating a different standard under the State Constitution than currently exists
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
121
See, e.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233 (rejecting the D.C Court of Appeals holding that
there must be some justification other than the lawful arrest to conduct the search). A lawful
arrest is a “reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to arrest requires no additional justification.” Id. at 235.
122
De Santis, 385 N.E.2d at 580. While considering Chadwick, the court stated, “[u]nder
these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever which would justify a delay of the
search until a warrant could be obtained.” Id.
123
Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 748.
119
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that the means, which “occasionally [] forbid a reasonable search or
permit an unreasonable one,” are justified in the name of efficiency.124 “The State Constitution, however, has not been read so broadly.”125 Rather, it has been interpreted to require that the validity of
each search be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the surrounding circumstances.126 Further, by implementing the exigency
requirement, which makes a warrantless search of a closed container
invalid unless justified by something more than the arrest, the Court
of Appeals adopted the warrant-primacy approach. This approach
leaves the “reasonable” determination to a neutral judge, not a law
enforcement officer; as a result, it is more restrictive on police activity. The means, which are less efficient or predictable, are justified in
the name of heightened constitutional protection.
As a result, New York opted to provide greater protection
than the federal approach, a move entirely within the bounds of the
“fundamental principle of Federalism.”127 The Federal Constitution
creates “only a base level of protection for individual’s rights and
[New York] is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity.”128 Pursuant to that authority, New York
did just that, with the purpose of providing more protection to individuals.
VI.

PRESENT: HOW WE GOT HERE

The result of New York State’s departure, as the court in Luna
accurately stated, is a “confusing landscape of decisional law which
is difficult to apply.”129 However, an easy-to-apply approach can be
attained without resorting back to the federal approach, which would
relinquish New York’s desire to provide heightened protection. In
fact, the court in Smith intended to do just that, but instead of following Smith’s instruction, lower courts challenged it by refusing to accept that higher protection should be afforded. The result has been
years of misinterpretation of what we should have learned from the
Court of Appeals. For these reasons, the criticisms enumerated in
124
125
126
127
128
129

Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1226-27.
Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 751 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *11.
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Luna are misguided because they should be aimed at the lower courts
for not consistently developing the law handed down by Smith and
Gokey in its intended fashion. However, one cannot blame the court
in Luna for this mistake; courts had been misinterpreting and misapplying the holdings of Smith and Gokey long before Antonio Luna
ever stepped foot into that New York County Courthouse.
A.

Argument: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Should not Differ Based on Whether an Item Is in
a Container

Luna criticized New York’s application of search incident to
arrest law because it unreasonably places a higher expectation of privacy in an item simply because of its location within a container.130
The court displayed strong resistance to the notion that reasonable
expectations of privacy differ depending on whether a closed container is involved.131 This view is in line with New York v. Belton,132
which placed no emphasis on the privacy interest associated with
closed containers.133
The New York Court of Appeals first shed light on the importance of a container in a search-incident-to-arrest analysis in De
Santis. The court recognized that a privacy right remains in a container, even after arrest, unless there is a “legitimate governmental interest” in the need for protection of safety or from destruction of evidence.134 From there, the importance placed on a closed container
grew exponentially. In Smith, the court stated, “[a]lthough probable
cause to [arrest] will justify the search of his person, it will not necessarily justify the search of a container readily accessible to him.”135
By emphasizing the term ‘closed container,’ the court indicated that
an arrestee’s privacy interest to be secure from unreasonable searches
130

Id. at *8.
Id.
132
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
133
Id. at 460. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not place emphasis on whether
a closed container was involved, the New York Court of Appeals on remand advanced the
position that there should exist a privacy interest in a container when it stated, “the State
Constitution protects the privacy interest of the people . . . not only in their persons, but in
their houses, papers and effects as well, against the unfettered discretion of government officials to search or seize.” Belton, 432 N.E.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
134
De Santis, 385 N.E.2d at 580 (“To be sure, the arrest of [the] defendant, standing
alone, did not destroy whatever privacy interests he had in the contents of the suitcase.”).
135
Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227 (internal citation omitted).
131
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and seizures is distinguishable when it comes to his ‘person’ versus
his ‘effects.’
In Luna, the court believed the heightened privacy approach
“assigns distinctions of constitutional significance . . . to facts which
have little relevance to the reasonable expectations of privacy which
people rely upon in their daily lives.”136 This was supported by the
theory that an individual does not put something within a container
with the intent to provide “an additional layer of privacy.” 137 Rather,
items are placed within a container for other reasons.138 One reason
provided was that “[a] person might wrap small objects in paper to
shield them from view when they are removed from a pocket.”139
However, if one puts an item in a container in order to “shield it from
view” once that item is removed from a pocket or backpack, would
that not indicate the intent to provide “an additional layer of privacy?” At the very least, it demonstrates the intent to keep the contents
private from public view.
Luna’s argument is persuasive with regard to the other examples given—coins and cigarettes–that those items are not put in a
container to provide more privacy. However, an approach that places
a higher or lower privacy interest on a container depending on what it
looks like on the outside would be troublesome. The fact that a person possesses a change purse or cigarette box does not necessarily
mean coins or cigarettes are located within that container. A coin
purse, in particular, can be used to hold any number of items.
Where there is a heightened privacy interest associated with a
closed container, the argument to shift away from the reasonableness
approach gains strength. That theory associates a higher invasion of
privacy with the initial arrest than it does with the subsequent search.
It cannot be disputed that an arrest is intrusive. However, by placing
emphasis on the closed container, New York has made clear it finds
the invasion of privacy greater when the contents of a closed container are searched than it does, not only when an arrest occurs, but also
when a search of the person of the arrestee is conducted.
This belief, that the search is more intrusive than the arrest itself, is not without merit. The search of a closed container found on
136

Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *8.
Id.
138
Id. (stating that a container may be used to keep items together, or make them easier to
access, or because that is how something is normally sold or kept, for example, cigarettes).
139
Id.
137
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an individual’s person has the potential to be immensely intrusive,
depending on what an individual decides to carry day-to-day. Societal changes over the past decade have led people to carry more private, personal items on them than they had in the past. Women keep
feminine products in small containers. Advancing technology has allowed businessmen to carry volumes of private information and documents on their person. A search of these types of containers, where
a person specifically intended to provide an “additional layer of privacy,” has the potential to be extremely intrusive and even embarrassing.
The intrusiveness of the search could be greater depending on
the circumstances surrounding an arrest. Arrests generally take place
in public, and it is not uncommon for an arrestee to be accompanied
by others. A search of a closed container in that instance would expose the contents not only to the arresting officer, but also to anyone
else close enough to observe what is transpiring. The problem is that
the actual contents of a container will never be known until it is
opened, at which point the privacy interest has been destroyed, and
the bell cannot be un-rung.
B.

Misconception: What Exactly Must Present the
Exigency

The arrestee? The circumstances? The container? Looking
at lower court decisions, the answer is unclear. According to Luna,
the arresting officer’s behavior can create an exigency. 140 However,
Smith had already given us the answer.
The heightened privacy interest associated with a closed container can only be overcome by “exigent circumstances, to search it
for weapons or evidence that otherwise might be destroyed.”141 The
court’s language provides a reasonable inference that a search may be
conducted where: (1) the container is not securely fastened by the police and the arrestee could “quickly reach its contents,” (2) the actions
of the arrestee provide reason to believe he may attempt to reach its
contents, and (3) the container is of a size large enough to hold a

140

Id. at *7 (“[Because Detective Macias] placed his arm through Mr. Luna’s handcuffed
arms to prevent him from escaping[,] Detective Macias was thus in a position where he
could easily have been physically assaulted by [Luna] . . . .”).
141
Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227 (emphasis added).
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weapon or evidence of the crime.142 The Appellate Division in People v. Rosado143 made the same point but in more explicit terms. “A
search incident to arrest [] may only extend to closed containers within the defendant’s possession or control when there is some reasonable basis for the belief that the contents of those containers” present
an exigency.144
Although case law instructs that the contents must pose the
exigency, this must nonetheless be the rule in order for the requirement to stand true to its purpose—that the privacy interest in a closed
container can only be overcome by the need to dispel an exigency.
Common sense dictates that if a container does not present an exigency, a search of that container will not dispel an exigency. As an
illustration, take Luna’s assertion that Detective Macias’ safety was
at issue because he placed his arms through Luna’s handcuffs. 145 Assuming the inquiry was whether an exigency existed, rather than
whether the contents posed an exigency, Macias would be justified in
searching the cigarette box because it is clear the exposure to physical assault presented an exigent circumstance. But in practical terms,
what would a search of the box solve? If Macias’ arms were still
through the handcuffs, the exigency would remain even after he
flipped open the top of the box. In other words, a search of the cigarette box would, in no way, reduce the risk of physical assault.
C.

Misconception: The Exigency Requirement Is
Easily Satisfied

Obviously, the exigency requirements have been applied with
different degrees of scrutiny. Some lower courts have applied a strict
construction, finding an exigency must be asserted.146 In contrast,
others have allowed an exigency to be inferred by the facts. 147 In
142

Id. (emphasis added).
625 N.Y.S.2d 162 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995).
144
Id. (emphasis added)
145
See supra text accompanying note 140.
146
See Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (finding the requirement unsatisfied because “[n]o
one, and most notably not the arresting officer,” suggested the container may hold a weapon
or that a search was necessary to preserve evidence). Similarly, in Evans, there was no indication of fear by the officer and no assertion of how any potential evidence could have been
destroyed. Evans, 922 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
147
See, e.g., Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (finding the exigency requirement satisfied because the search was done in close space and time and the “requisite exigency was readily
inferable”).
143
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Thompson, the court accepted a blanket assertion that an exigency existed, without analyzing the assertion in light of the facts.148 In other
cases, courts have found the possibility that an exigency might exist
sufficient.149
However, the decision in Smith, through its language and application, implied that the requirements be strictly construed and explained. First, it instructed that the circumstances justifying the
search must be considered at the time of the arrest.150 This indicates
that the justification provided can be subject to dispute and must be
able to withstand scrutiny. Further, through its relatively lengthy application, the court gave an explanation as to why the need to protect
officer safety was present,151 leaving the assertion unchallengeable.
As early as Gokey, the Court of Appeals instructed that the
reasonableness of an officer’s justification for dispensing with the
warrant requirement must be judged in light of the circumstances existing at the time of the arrest.152 By giving instruction on when the
reasonableness of the justification must be considered, it would follow that a reason must be given. Jimenez added that although “an officer need not affirmatively testify as to the safety concerns” posed
by the exigency, the exigency “must be affirmatively demonstrated.”153 There must be a “robust evidentiary showing” to satisfy the
search-incident-to-arrest exception.154
However, some courts treat the exigency requirement as selfexecuting and instead focus on the timing of the search.155 As a result, the requirement becomes a legal fiction because it is, in essence,
always satisfied. A closer look at People v. Wylie156 demonstrates
how this flawed approach came to fruition.
At the outset, the court implied that the only relevant inquiry
was whether the search was done close in space and time, as per Bel-

148
Thompson, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (“[T]he record reveals that the officer had a reasonable fear for his safety and that exigent circumstances remained at the time the box was
searched.”).
149
See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
150
Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227.
151
Id. at 1227-28.
152
Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725.
153
Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *4.
154
Id. at *5.
155
See generally Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1; Watkins, 682 N.Y.S.2d 40; Schobert, 463
N.Y.S.2d 277; Baker, 679 N.Y.S.2d 107.
156
666 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997).
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ton and De Santis.157 It applied the Belton rule that a search is valid
so long as it “closely follows the arrest” and cited to De Santis’ ‘de
minimus’ rationale in support.158 The court compared the facts before
it with the facts from De Santis because the two searches were “materially indistinguishable” and found that the search occurred immediately.159
Exigent circumstances were eventually addressed,160 but not
in conformity with the three steps set forth by Smith. The third
prong, which considers the size of the container, was undisputed because the search involved a plastic bag large enough to conceal a
weapon.161 As to the first prong—whether the arrestee could have
accessed the container—the court determined that because the container was not in the exclusive control of the police, the arrestee “easily could have reached for a weapon.”162 According to this reasoning,
the first prong will always be satisfied so long as the container is not
within the exclusive control of the police, even if the arrestee has
been handcuffed. Regarding the second prong—whether the arrestee’s actions provided reason to believe he may attempt to reach
the container—the court never referenced specific, articulable actions
undertaken by Wylie. Instead, it generally stated,
[A] determined arrestee may use means other than his
hands—such as kicking or shoving the arresting officer—to disrupt the arrest process in order to gain a
weapon or destroy evidence. Such actions are a realistic possibility when the search occurs within close
proximity to the arrest, as was the case here.163
After the court established the search was reasonable, it discussed the
preservation of evidence prong.164
The approach utilized by the court in Wylie is misguided for
157

Id. at 3.
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 4. The court alluded to exigencies, without ever actually mentioning the term.
161
The bag itself was evidence of a theft, so there was reason to believe it may contain
further evidence of the crime for which the arrest was based. Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
162
Id. at 4. The defendant argued that despite the close space and time, any exigency was
dispelled once he was handcuffed. Id. at 3. The court disagreed and cited De Santis as the
“governing standard,” which asks, “whether the property has been reduced to the ‘exclusive
control’ of the police.” Id. at 4.
163
Id.
164
Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
158
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several reasons. First, it failed to abide by the rule of precedent. Belton and De Santis, although often referred to for background and insight, should not have been cited to for applicable law after Smith and
Gokey because the latter materially distinguished and limited the
holdings of the former. Instead, the court in Wylie only applied portions of Smith—the portions that discussed timing—in combination
with Belton.165 As a result, it inaccurately bolstered Belton’s ‘close
space and time’ aspect to provide the impression that, because an exigency could remain throughout the process of an arrest, the only real
inquiry is whether the search happened immediately. The court in
Wylie seemed to have missed Smith’s instruction that “[t]here must,
however, be circumstances at the time of the arrest justifying the
search.”166 Therefore, when Smith is read as a whole, it provides that
when an exigency is present, the subsequent search must be conducted close in space and time. Instead, the court in Wylie advanced a
drastically different premise, that where a search is done in close
space and time, an exigency will always be present.
Under this approach, the exigency requirement is always satisfied, simply because of the hostile nature of an arrest.167 The court
made this point itself by stating, “a determined arrestee may use
means other than his hands” to create a danger.168 It took the position
that an arrest is inherently an emergency circumstance, and an arrestee can always pose a threat, even if handcuffed.169 In turn, this
approach also misconstrues what may provide search authority. The
court in Wylie never explained why the search of the container was
immediately necessary, but it instead attempted to use the surrounding circumstances to demonstrate urgency.170 The misplaced focus
here is perplexing because the court devoted a portion of its opinion
to discussing the importance of the bag being classified as a ‘closed
container.’171
165

Id. at 3, 4.
Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1227.
167
See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 773-74 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“An arrest itself may often
create an emergency situation . . . .”).
168
Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
169
Id.
170
Id. The court found a likelihood that the container may contain “further evidence of
the crime,” but it never explained how that presented the need to search in order to protect
the contents from destruction or concealment. Id.
171
On appeal, the People argued that the evidence did not establish the bag was closed or
sealed; therefore, the defendant did not have a privacy right in the bag. Id. at 2. Although
the court agreed, the People had not raised the issue at the suppression hearing and were,
166
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Although the outcome of Wylie, which found the search valid,
is not contested, the framework applied to reach that conclusion was
misguided and could have negative consequences under other circumstances. This new test would allow the exigency requirement to
be satisfied across the board, and the only consideration would be
whether the search took place in close space and time, a decision that
remains entirely with the arresting officer.
VII.

FUTURE: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: A SUGGESTION

The New York Constitution has been interpreted to “require
that the reasonableness of each search . . . be determined on the basis
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”172 This implies
the need for a particularized, case-by-case analysis. In order to remain true to the State Constitution and the Court of Appeal’s desire
to afford heightened protection, there is only one option when it
comes to bright-line rules: no more bright-line rules. A suggestion on
how the framework should be applied is necessary.
Distinction must remain between the search of an arrestee’s
‘person’ and a search of his or her ‘effects.’173 Therefore, the initial
consideration should be whether the intended search involves a
closed container found on or within the “immediate control” of the
arrestee.174 If it does not, this framework need not be considered. If
it does, Smith tells us there is a higher privacy interest involved. Because the search in Luna involved a cigarette box, found on Luna’s
person at the time of the arrest, the heightened privacy interest applied.175 From there, two separate requirements must be met: (1) exigent circumstances must be “affirmatively demonstrated;” and (2) the
arrest and search must be done contemporaneously. 176
Exigent circumstances can be demonstrated in one of two
ways: as either the need to protect “the safety of the public and the
arresting officer”, or as the need to “protect[ ] evidence from destruction or concealment.”177 The critical question must be whether the
thus, precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3.
172
Smith, 452 N.E.2d at 1226-27.
173
Id. at 1227.
174
31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 481 (2014).
175
See Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (“Defendant’s cigarette box was undeniably a closed
container in which he had a privacy expectation for constitutional purposes.”).
176
Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *3, *4.
177
Id.
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container or its contents present an exigency.178 In order to satisfy
this requirement, there must be an affirmative assertion that an immediate search of the container was necessary, and the reasonableness of that assertion is to be judged at the time of the arrest. Therefore, in Luna, the inquiry would end here unless there was a
reasonable assertion that the cigarette box posed a threat. Detective
Macias admitted that “he looked in the cigarette box to see if there
were narcotics inside,” and the court found that there was “a reasonable belief that the cigarette box [ ] might contain narcotics. 179 Arguably, the fact that the cigarette box might contain narcotics allows the
court to consider whether the threat posed by the container amounted
to an exigency.
The court should consider first whether the container is large
enough to hold a weapon. If it is, consider the crime for which the
arrest was made. An arrest based on a violent crime involving a
weapon may, by itself, provide the need to search a container. 180 An
arrest based on a violent crime not involving a weapon will not provide search authority itself but could increase the need to conduct a
search.181 Where the crime was non-violent, the surrounding circumstances could enhance the need to search.182 Assuming the container
posed a threat to safety, only then should an officer consider the arrestee’s behavior and actions, specifically whether they provide reason to believe the arrestee may attempt to reach the container. If the
arrestee demonstrates resistance or does not cooperate with the officer, the need to search would increase. For purposes of analyzing
Luna, this line of inquiry is irrelevant because although Macias “was
initially concerned that [Luna] might be armed,” he did not allege, or
even believe, that there might be a weapon inside the cigarette box.183
If the container is not large enough to hold a weapon, the fo178

Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162; Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 96-97.
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3, *7.
180
Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *4 (citing People v. Johnson, 449 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 1982) (noting the defendant struck the victim in the head with a gun and
threatened to shoot him)).
181
See, e.g., Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725 (taking into consideration the fact that the defendant was arrested for two nonviolent crimes).
182
See, e.g., Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224. Smith was arrested for jumping a subway turnstile
without paying the fare and wearing a bulletproof vest. Id. at 1225-26. The briefcase Smith
had been carrying presented the need for protection of safety, because it was large enough to
contain a weapon, and although the defendant’s crime was not one that would be suggestive
of a weapon, he was wearing a bulletproof vest, which enhanced suspicion. Id. at 1227.
183
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3.
179
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cus must switch to preserving evidence. Obviously, the container
must be capable of enclosing the evidence sought, and that evidence
must, in some way, be connected to the crime for which the defendant was arrested. Otherwise, the arresting officer could simply use
the arrest as a basis to conduct an unlimited search in hopes of finding unrelated evidence or more proof of criminality. In People v.
Hendricks,184 the court noted that the fact that the arrest took place in
a drug-prone apartment alone was insufficient, and because the defendant was arrested for trespassing, it would be “difficult to imagine” what evidence could have existed in connection with that specific crime.185 In a different opinion, the First Department stated that a
search motivated by the arresting officer’s intent to find and retrieve
new evidence or contraband, “would be manifestly inadequate as a
predicate” to search incident to arrest.186
Unlike the arrest for trespass in Hendricks, the arrest in Luna
involved the sale of drugs, and therefore the evidence sought by
Macias—the narcotics believed to be inside the container—was connected to the crime for which the arrest was based. However, it can
be argued that the container at issue was not large enough to hold the
alleged evidence connected to the crime, because Detective Macias
admitted “[h]e did not believe that the planned sale of 100 grams of
cocaine would fit inside the cigarette box.”187
In People v. Ortiz,188 the search of a package found on the arrestee was deemed justified “for the purposes of ‘the protection of evidence from destruction or concealment.’ ”189 There, police saw the
defendant hide “his drug supply on his person” during an observed
sale of drugs.190 In contrast, Luna held the box in his hands throughout the course of the arrest, and therefore made no attempt to hide the
container or its contents. Instead, the police in Luna merely had reason to believe that he might have been concealing something.
In Allen, even where the defendant made an attempt to conceal the cigarette box at issue, the search was found improper.191
184

841 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007).
Id. at 97.
186
Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (referring to the People’s speculation that the search was
motivated by “the arresting officer’s desire to retrieve and safeguard marked buy money”).
187
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3.
188
593 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1993).
189
Id. at 7 (alteration in the original) (quoting Gokey, 457 N.E.2d at 725).
190
Id.
191
Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 483, 486.
185
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Similar to Luna, the “small and innocuous” container could not have
presented a concern for safety, and the defendant was handcuffed
when the search was conducted.192 “Under [those] circumstances, the
record must demonstrate that despite the compelling restraint of
handcuffs, [the] defendant retained the capacity to destroy whatever
evidence was contained in the cigarette box.”193 In Luna, the court
argued that despite being handcuffed, “the [d]efendant could easily
have taken steps to destroy or conceal the contents of the cigarette
box” because the container was not in the exclusive control of the police.194 Therefore, the court attempted to use the non-exclusivity in
order to establish the exigency requirement. This blanket assertion is
identical to that made in Wylie,195 which cannot be deemed sufficient.
Further, there was no indication how, or even if, Luna would have
been able to destroy the evidence despite the “compelling restraint”
of the handcuffs.196
The case most comparable to Luna is Rosado, which involved
the search of a “little change pouch.”197 The small container was
found on the defendant’s person, and there was no suggestion that the
container concealed a weapon.198 In Rosado, despite the drug-related
arrest, the arresting officer admitted that he had not been given any
indication that Rosado would have drugs on his person.199 Because
the coin purse did not pose an exigency, the court found the search
invalid.200 Similarly, despite the fact that Luna was arrested for his
alleged participation in a drug transaction, Macias had not received
any indication that Luna would have drugs on him. In fact, Macias
did not know Luna had any involvement in the transaction whatsoever until Luna knocked on the window of the undercover vehicle.201
Therefore, despite the drug-related arrest, it is undisputable that the
circumstances in Luna did not objectively lead Macias to believe Luna had drugs on his person, let alone in his pack of cigarettes.
Assuming the exigency prong is satisfied, the court should
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id. at 486; Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *3.
Allen, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7.
See infra part VI, section C.
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7.
Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *2.
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then consider the “spatial and temporal limitations.”202 The timing
aspect must be an absolute requirement because if a search is not
done within a short time from the arrest, there is, by definition, no exigency.203 If an officer holds onto a container for a prolonged period
of time without opening it, his or her own actions would indicate that
there was no exigent threat. In Luna, the record indicated that the
search of the cigarette box was done in close space and time to the arrest because Macias took only a few steps before looking into the box
and only a matter of moments had passed.204
Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement, a search is no longer ‘incident to arrest’ when the container is within the exclusive control of the police.205 Therefore, even
where a container presents an exigency, if it is no longer accessible
by the arrestee, it does not fall within the exception because “there
[is] absolutely no reason” to justify an immediate search without first
obtaining a warrant.206 In making this determination, courts have
considered whether the scene of the arrest was secured, taking into
account the number of officers present.207
In reaching its decision, the court in Luna mentioned that at
the time of arrest, Luna and the arresting officer were alone on the
street.208 However, the court immediately noted that the defendant
and detective were not, in fact, alone on the street, as there was an
undercover officer in a vehicle close by.209 Therefore, it was merely
as far as the defendant was aware that the two were alone on the
street. Additionally, it could be argued that the container was not in
the exclusive control of the police because Luna held the box in his
hands at the time he was handcuffed and arrested. However, Detective Macias conceded on cross-examination that because he patted
down and handcuffed Luna, and “had possession of the cigarette
box,” Macias had control of the container so that Luna could not ac-

202

Jimenez, 2014 WL 696481, at *3.
Exigent Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio
nary/exigent?show=0&t=1398549048 (last visited May 2, 2014) (defining exigent as “requiring immediate aid or action”).
204
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7-8.
205
31 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 481 (2014).
206
Rosado, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 162; Hendricks, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
207
Wylie, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
208
Luna, 2012 WL 1059392, at *7.
209
Id.
203
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cess it or destroy its contents.210 Therefore, at that point, when Luna
could no longer destroy any potential evidence and Detective Macias
was in possession of the cigarette box, there was absolutely no reason
a warrant could not have first been obtained before the search was
conducted.
Under the suggested approach, the facts in Luna demonstrate
that the search was impermissible. Although the search was done in
close space and time, neither the cigarette box nor its contents posed
an exigency. Detective Macias admitted he did not believe that Luna
had a weapon or the 100 grams of cocaine in the cigarette box.211
Further, not only did Detective Macias have no indication that Luna
had drugs on his person, he did not even know who Luna was at the
time of the arrest.212 Even if it were found that an exigency had existed, at the moment Macias gained exclusive possession of the cigarette box, that exigency was dispelled. Thus, it was entirely possible
for Macias to delay the search until a warrant was procured. For these reasons, the search of the cigarette box in Luna should have been
found to be invalid.
VIII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
To be clear, the suggested approach will not reduce an officer’s ability to protect him or herself from danger. Where a container is large enough to hold a weapon, and the surrounding circumstances indicate a need for protection, an officer may undoubtedly
conduct a search incident to arrest for protection. Therefore, the proposed rule maintains an officer’s discretion to search a container posing a threat to safety, but reduces the officer’s discretion when it
comes to searching smaller, seemingly harmless containers.
The proposed rule affords individuals with insight as to the
extent of their protection. The rule provides that surrounding circumstances may be considered, and no one factor will be dispositive; this
indicates a sliding scale where privacy can either be reduced or maintained. If an individual commits a violent crime and has a container
large enough to hold a weapon, it will likely be searched. If an individual resists arrest or does not cooperate with the officer, the likelihood of a search increases. If the container on an individual’s person
210
211
212

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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is large enough to hold further evidence of the crime for which he or
she was arrested, the possibility of the search increases.
A final consideration to take into account is how the different
search-incident-to-arrest approaches will fare with evolving technology. For the most part, ‘closed container’ cases have arisen in the
context of purses, paper bags, wallets, and cigarette boxes. What if,
instead of carrying a cigarette box in his front coat pocket, Antonio
Luna was carrying a cell phone or a digital camera? How much
search authority for police would be desirable in that closed container
situation?
New York has not specifically addressed the issue of whether
a cell phone may be searched pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest
exception. However, federal courts have, and the circuits have been
split. The Fifth Circuit found the search of a cell phone, including
text messages, could be searched as incident to arrest.213 The Fourth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits agreed.214 The First Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion, finding a search of cell phone data invalid as incident to arrest.215 The Eleventh Circuit has declined to address the
issue.216
Speculating how search incident to arrest jurisprudence will
evolve in response to advancing technology may make one hesitant
before giving more power to the police to search and impede on individual privacy. Now, more than ever, individuals carry an immense
amount of private and personal information in their pockets every
time they walk out their front door. Caution should be exercised before instituting a “bright-line” rule that provides the police with unqualified search authority upon arrest. Rather, it is imperative that a
framework be adopted that is flexible enough to emerge with chang-

213

United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711-12 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007)).
214
Id. at 712.
215
United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[the court was not convinced]
that such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence.”). Thus, it appears the court applied a framework more akin to the New York approach than the traditional Federal approach allowing an unqualified search authority. Id. It
did so by strictly construing the justifications put forth in Chimel that allowed for the searchincident-to-arrest exception. Id.
216
United States v. Chaidez-Reyes, 1:13-CR-158-0DE-AJB, 2014 WL 547178, at *11
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2014) (quoting United States v. Allen, 416 F. App’x 21, 27 (11th Cir.
2011) (“It is a fairly difficult question, however, it also is a question that we need not answer
today.”)).
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ing times.217 The further courts move towards a broad scope and expansive police discretion when applying this exception, the less value
the Fourth Amendment has to an individual’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Jacqueline K. Iaquinta

217
United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must
have [the] capacity of adaption to a changing world.”).
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